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THE COURT OF APPEALS, 1954 TERM

TORTS
Flimsy Covering Over Hole Constitutes Negligence
In an action by a father as administrator for a twelve year old youth who fell
to his death, allegedly as the result of the defendant's affirmative act of negligence
in placing an insecure covering over a deep opening on the property adjacent to
school grounds, the Court affirmed the Appellate Division's judgment for the
plaintiff;' children were known to have played in the area and to have passed
through defendant's premises. 2
Since 1895 the courts of New York have refused to apply the "attractive
nuisance" doctrine3 to situations of this nature. No duty of care is imposed upon an4
owner of property to protect a trespasser or mere licensee from unreasonable risk;
liability for personal injury can only be justified where the property owner commits
affirmative acts of negligence, or creates an unreasonable risk, or intentionally injures such persons.5 In determining what constitutes unreasonable risk "the jury
is entitled to take into consideration the well-known propensities of children to
climb about and play.""
The dissenting judges, with an ease perhaps born of over-simplification, stated
in three lines that defendant was not shown to have violated a duty owing to a
trespasser. 7 The majority distinguished the cases cited by the dissenters on the
theory that the defective conditions in those cases were the result of failure to
repair the effects of decay (non-feasance, or non affirmative acts of negligence)
which is in contradistinction to the instant case, where the defendant placed
"flimsy" pieces of wood over the hole fifty-five feet deep, thereby creating a risk
tantamount to a deceptive trap for the unwary. We may conclude that although
the "attractive nuisance" doctrine has not been followed in New York, the same
result may be arrived at by the conventional tests of negligence: proximate cause,
foreseeability and standard of care, which may seem legally tenuous when applied
to these types of situations but which may be justified through a supervening
public policy of risk distribution.8
1. Mayer v. Temple Properties,307 N. Y. 559, 122 N. E. 2d 909 (1954).
2. 283 App. Div. 786, 129 N. Y. S. 2d 228 (1st Dep't 1954).
3. Walsh v. Fitchburg R?. 1. Co., 145 N. Y. 301, 39 N. E. 1068 (1895).
4. Carbone v. Mackchil Realty Corp., 296 N. Y. 154, 71 N. E. 2d 447 (1947);
Mendelowitz v. Neisner, 258 N. Y. 181, 179 N. E. 373 (1932); Basmajian v. Board
of Education, 211 App. Div. 347, 207 N. Y. Supp. 298 (1st Dep't 1925).
5. Note 3, supra.
6. Parnell v. Holland Furnace Co., 234 App. Div. 567, 256 N. Y. Supp. 323
(4th Dep't); aftPd, 260 N. Y. 604, 184 N. E. 112 (1932).

7. See note 4, supra.

8. Douglas, Vicarious Liability and Administration of Risk, 38 YALE L. J. 584,
720 (1929); Laski, The Basis of Vicarious Liability, 26 YALE L. J. 106 (1916).

